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Question 
What does the literature say about the relationship between armed groups and 
mining/extractives, and past approaches to limiting their influence? The main area of interest is 
the Great Lakes region.  
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The relationship between armed groups and mining is complex. Reports of armed interference in 
mining are provided by the United Nations (UN) Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) and reported in the literature, including which groups have been found to operate 
in which areas. Academic analysis finds the presence of industrial mining companies reinforces 
the power of politico-military entrepreneurs. 
This rapid review found a relatively large body of literature on the issue of armed groups and 
mining. Articles are a mix of academic literature and agency report prioritised based on relevance 
to the question, date (more recent), and location (Great Lakes, specifically DRC). They are 
recorded in annotated bibliography format. Further references which were not prioritised but 
provide useful information. The complexity of the issue requires broader investigation than is 
possible within the scope of a K4D helpdesk.  
Key findings:  
Linkage between mining and armed groups:  
• A report on 182 mines in Eastern DRC prone to interference estimates their total 
production value to be USD 35.5 million (de Brier, 2021). A report sampling 300 mines 
finds armed groups present at 16% and the Congolese army present at 36% (Malango, 
2016). Direct interference was found in 84% of the mines that had armed group or 
military presence. Interference in the mining sector often involves threats of violence or 
destruction of property if money is not paid to the armed groups for protection. Illegal 
taxation activities include charging a fee upon entrance and exit to a mine, charging per 
bag of minerals taken out of the mine, and charging a monthly fee to the mine owners.  
• Initiatives for responsible supply chains include the International Tin Association Tin 
Supply Chain Initiative Programme for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains; and a 
validation system carried out by teams of government officials and international partners. 
Reports of success of these schemes are mixed and it is possible that sites attracted to 
validation schemes already have low levels of violence.  
Policy and regulation: 
• There is high chance of corruption in certification and validation processes. US 
corporations have reported difficulty in determining the country of origin of materials, 
particularly those with dispersed supply chains. Standards implementation in the mid- to 
downstream depend on upstream quality enforcement where institutional capacity is 
lacking. Resources for ensuring mineral bags are sealed at the mine level are low. 
Auditing costs are high for artisanal mining regulation.  
• Strategic Dialogue on Sustainable Raw Materials for Europe suggest using a minimum 
standards criteria, which can be raised incrementally as operators gradually improve their 
practice (Eslave, 2018). Local cultural and social dynamics need to be considered for 
adequate incentive certification scheme design.  
• It is noted that armed groups have other sources of funding outside of direct involvement 
in artisanal mining, such as road blocking and looting. International policies are found to 
focus on conflict-free sourcing rather than peace promotion. Unintended negative 
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impacts of international policies are discussed in the literature. Responsible sourcing has 
been found to reduce revenues for miners because of the costs of implementing 
regulations. Loss of revenue has been linked to a marked increase in infant deaths as a 
result of mothers reduced consumption of infant healthcare goods.     
• EU regulations are criticised for targeting importers as this means companies dealing 
with the finished product will not be accountable (Addaney & Lubaale, 2021).  
Literature mentioning a gender dimension in this topic was not relevant enough to the question 
for inclusion in the main body of this report. Two references in the further links section discuss 
gender. No mention of disability was found within the scope of this report.  
2. Linkage between mining and armed groups in DRC 
Mapping artisanal mining areas and mineral supply chains in eastern DR Congo. 
Impact of armed interference & responsible sourcing 
Matthysen, K., Spittaels, S., & Schouten, P. (2019). The International Peace Information Service 
(IPIS). 
https://ipisresearch.be/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/1904-IOM-mapping-eastern-DRC.pdf  
This report provides figures on the levels of armed interference in different provinces in eastern 
DRC. It is based on ten years of research. Armed interference is most frequent in North Kivu, 
South Kivu, and Ituri. Armed interference was reported at a third of the visited mines or more. 
Groups interfering in North Kivu include the Mai Simba, the two Nduma Defense of Congo (NDC) 
factions, and the Nyatura militia. South Kivu is mainly impacted by Raia Mutomboki and Mai 
Yakutumba. Ituri face interference from the Forces de Résistance Patriotique d’Ituri (FRPI) and 
Mai rebels. Overall across eastern DRC, units of the Congolese army (FARDC) are the most 
often identified.  
Data shows that “artisanal mining only constitutes one among many sources of financing for 
conflict actors in eastern DRC, such as roadblocks and the taxation of other kinds of natural 
resources. Research on roadblocks demonstrates that armed actors do not need to have direct 
control over mining sites to benefit from the artisanal mining sector. While armed actors, and 
especially army units, might not be physically present at some mines in militarised mining areas, 
IPIS notes a consistent pattern whereby the army instead consistently erects roadblocks some 
distance away from these mining sites. The Congolese army is present at almost half of the total 
number of roadblocks that were mapped, and is responsible for nearly half of all the instances in 
which minerals were taxed” (p7).   
IPIS data is unable to prove that armed conflicts are related to interference in the mining sector. 
Rather, armed interference often manifests as illegal protection rackets1 with armed 
confrontations taking place, elsewhere. The illegal protection rackets contribute to overall 
insecurity in the region and makes it difficult to conduct ethically responsible business.  
 
1 ‘a criminal system of taking money from people in exchange for agreeing not to hurt them or damage their 
property’ https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/protection-racket  
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In Eastern Congo there are mines covered by the iTSCi (International Tin Association Tin Supply 
Chain Initiative) Programme for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains. And ‘green validated mines’ 
which are visited by a validation team including government, state agencies and international 
partners which assess the security situation and socio-economic risks. IPIS record data on 
armed interference in iTSCi mines and validated mines to compare with interference in non-iTSCi 
mines and non-validated mines finding that mines with responsible sourcing initiatives have lower 
levels of armed interference.2 However, it may not be the case that the programmes create better 
security, but rather that sites with low-level armed involvement are attracted to the validation or 
iTSCi programmes. Responsible sourcing is carried out in most accessible sites and armed 
interference continues undisturbed in more remote areas.  
Interviews with local stakeholders finds a perception that responsible sourcing has decreased 
their revenues. “Miners claimed that landowners, cooperatives and state officials have raised 
their levies. Consequently, people complained that responsible sourcing has mostly benefited 
local elites” (p9). 
Challenges to responsible supply chains include limited state agents being unable to ensure 
mineral bags are sealed at the mine level with traceability tags. Corruption has been found 
present in the tagging process including levying of illegal taxes. In some areas contamination of 
supply chains are linked to armed groups. Increased responsible sourcing also seems to be 
particularly beneficial to local elites. 
There is a risk that responsible sourcing does not address the drivers of armed interference. The 
report concludes that sustainable sourcing interventions have limited impact on local 
development.  
 
Luddites in the Congo? Analyzing violent responses to the expansion of industrial 
mining amidst militarization  
Verweijen, J. (2017). City, 21(3-4), 466-482. 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13604813.2017.1331567?journalCode=ccit20  
This paper analyses the interplay between armed mobilisation against industrial mining in the 
Fizi–Kabambare region of DRC. “It argues that the presence and practices of industrial mining 
companies reinforce the overall power position of politico-military entrepreneurs. This occurs 
both directly, by efforts to co-opt them, and indirectly, by fueling dynamics of conflict, insecurity 
and protection that crucially underpin these entrepreneurs’ dominance. At the same time, due to 
the eastern Congo’s convoluted political opportunity structure for contentious action, politico-
military entrepreneurs enlarge the scope for social mobilization against industrial mining. They 
offer a potential counterweight to repressive authorities and provide collective action frames that 
inspire contentious politics.” (p466).  
 
2 iTSCi mines represented 38% of sites visited and validated mines, 26%.  
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The study contexts align to some extent with a framework proposed by Holden & Jacobsen 
(2017)3 which links large-scale mining (LSM) to violent conflict through 1) protection rents, 2) 
stifling opposition through militarisation, and 3) grievances creating support for rebellion. 
However, interplay was found to be more complex than the framework. For example “While LSM 
companies like Banro indeed provide armed actors with resources by paying protection rents, 
these payments are part of a wider and more fine-grained politics of co-opting politico-military 
entrepreneurs. Such cooptation may also assume the form of providing favors to civilian political 
actors that are in close contact with armed groups” (p478).  
  
 
3 Holden, William, and R. Daniel Jacobson. 2007. “Mining Amid Armed Conflict: Nonferrous Metals Mining in the 
Philippines.” The Canadian Geographer/Le Ge´ographe canadien 51 (4): 475–500. 
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Conflict analysis and stakeholder mapping in South Kivu and Ituri 
de Brier, G. (2021). IPIS.  
https://ipisresearch.be/publication/madini-conflict-analysis-and-stakeholder-mapping-in-the-
mining-regions-of-south-kivu-and-ituri/  
This report is a context analysis for the Madini project which aims to improve security and 
stability around mining sites in East DRC, and reduce smuggling in the Great Lakes region. The 
project targets 182 sites selected as particularly prone to interference from Forces armées de la 
république démocratique du Congo (FARDC). The production value at the 182 sites is estimated 
to be USD 35.5 million. FARDC are present in 95% of the sites in South Kivu, and 66% in Ituri. 
Presence is often accompanied by interference including tax on people. There is also non-state 
armed group involvement. There are estimated to be 125 non-state armed groups in North and 
South Kivu alone giving an indicator to the complexity of conflicts in East Congo.  
One of the problems is that Civil Servants in the mining authority are not being paid their salary 
so predate on the profits of artisanal miners. Aside from mining, agriculture and civil service, the 
only other means of subsistence is to join an armed-group and get involved in taxing and looting. 
“For the miners, armed groups and undisciplined soldiers are the ‘triggers’ of ‘immediate’ 
conflicts because they impose themselves as mediators in disputes between stakeholders in the 
mine, and this ‘mediation’ becomes a new source of income” (p17). Furthermore, “the presence 
of natural resources, in a context where the state is failing and relies on an unpaid army to assert 
its authority, leads to a militarisation of society and the economy, where poverty and the tradition 
of conflict drive new recruits into armed groups.” (p20). 
Specific conflicts in the Shabunda region include opposition to the extension of a national park, 
rivalry over site ownership, tension between miners and processing entities, and failure of the 
trading centre to stop contamination of mineral supply chains. 
Causes of conflict in the Fizi region include opposition of the local population to a mining 
company, rivalry between cooperatives, and dispute by local chiefs over chiefdom.  
Conflict in the mining sector in Djuga is caused by the presence of the CODECO4 group which 
the government are trying to demobilise and neutralise. The CODECO maintain tension between 
Lendu and Hama with regards to mine ownership. Another source of conflict in the region is over 
the decision by a mining cooperative to establish a Chinese mining company for semi-industrial 
exploitation igniting conflict between two groups5 which persists despite the exit of the Chinese 
company.  
Mambasa and Kalehe have less conflict of the five regions visited.  
The report concludes with recommendations specific to national authorities, for the FARDC, for 
the provincial authorities of South Kivu and Ituru, for the Madini consortium, for foreign-owned 
industrial companies, for Congolese-owned industrial companies, for cooperatives, and for civil 
society organisations.    
 
 
4 Association of various military groups in the DRC 
5 Taratibu and Kepka 
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Armed groups and mineral extraction in the DRC  
Malango, W. (2016). World Policy, (March 8th, 2016) http://worldpolicy.org/2016/03/08/armed-
groups-and-mineral-extraction-in-the-drc/ 
This study, undertaken with the DRC Entrepreneurship and Development Initiative, found “there 
is not enough evidence to prove that armed groups operating in the eastern DRC rely solely on 
illegal exploitation of minerals to carry out their operations. Therefore, more research should be 
done to assess the factors that have helped these armed groups stay afloat”6. Authors suggest 
developing an anti-armed groups strategy for the region. Mining sector strategies including 
embargoes, due diligence, traceability, certification, and formalization have not deterred armed 
groups from violating human rights and disrupting state authorities.  
The study categorises armed group involvement as ‘presence’ as one category and the further 
whether this presence involved interference or not. Armed groups were involved by presence in 
16% of the 300 mines visited and the Congolese army in 36%. Armed groups and the national 
army were involved more directly in interference in 84% of the mines they were present in. Of the 
131 mines registering interference, illegal taxation by armed groups was occurring in 35 of them, 
buying minerals in 2, digging for minerals in 1, and forced labour in 4. Interference by the 
Congolese army was occurring through illegal taxation in 61 mines, they were digging for 
minerals in 12, forced labour in 9 and buying minerals in 7. 
Illegal taxation activities included charging anyone leaving or entering the mine a small fee, 
charging a small fee per bag of minerals taken out of the mine, and charging a monthly fee to the 
mine owners.  
The author concludes that it is difficult to link armed groups ability to perpetrate violence and 
disrupt the state with mineral activities as the Congolese army interference was found to be 
greater.  
 
Taxation, Stateness and Armed Groups: Public Authority and Resource Extraction 
in Eastern Congo 
Hoffmann, K., Vlassenroot, K., & Marchais, G. (2016). Development and Change, 47(6), 1434-1456. 
https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/8149699/file/8149704.pdf 
This paper describes the taxation practices of armed groups in Eastern DRC and argues that 
“their modes of taxation are based on long-standing registers of authority and practices of rule 
that originate in the colonial era” (p1434). Taxation ranges from plunder to protection rackets, to 
the material reciprocation of the recognition of rights. 
Case studies show how taxation in Kalehe and Walikale revolve around taxes for protection 
arrangements. And that taxation of contemporary armed groups are often framed within “existing 
registers of authority and modes of rule, notably by re-activating ethnoterritorial ontologies of 
 
6 Page number unavailable 
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local political space, community and citizenship to legitimize extractive taxation practices” 
(p1452).  
 
Artisanal or industrial conflict minerals? Evidence from Eastern Congo 
Stoop, N., Verpoorten, M., & Van der Windt, P. (2019). World Development, 122, 660-674. 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X19301780  
This research looks at the differences between artisanal and large-scale mining (LSM) links with 
local conflict. Rising mineral prices increase battles over artisanal mines with competition 
between armed groups, but less so for LSM. Expansion of industrial mining seems to decrease 
battles as companies secure their concessions. Expansion can trigger riots when it crowds out 
artisanal mining. 
 
United Nations Group of Experts on the DRC 
Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
[S/2021/560] 
United Nations Security Council, June 2021 
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2053905/S_2021_560_E.pdf  
This is the most recent of the Group of Experts (and UN Security Council) reports on the DRC. It 
provides highly detailed information on armed group activity in the mining sector in North Kivu, 
Ituri, and South Kivu. 
The Group documents illegal presence of particular groups identifying specific areas and mines. 
It reports on which groups benefitted from mining and taxation and in which areas. It records 
where different groups have fought and taken control of certain mines. It reports gold trading 
from certain locations with certain countries. For example “Gold production from Walikale was 
traded in Rwanda, via Bukavu, and in Uganda” (paragraph 54, p16). There are also reports of an 
armed group benefitting from taxation in gold mining sites in two areas where gold was exported 
to Hong Kong.  
Reports of clashes between specific armed-groups and traders are described. The Group 
documented armed activity at some mines covered by due diligence schemes as well as fraud 
and cross-border smuggling. Armed clashes between the police and armed individuals are 
reported. Reports from diggers, traders and authorities describe armed activity in specific mines. 
Eye-witnesses describe the distribution of machetes and rifles to diggers for use in clashes in 
Rubya, for example.  
Details of mineral fraud are documented despite improved tagging procedures and the report 
notes areas of supply chains that may be contaminated. Named individual businessmen and gold 
traders are identified as providing food and finance to armed combatants digging for gold.  
Earlier reports include: 
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Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
[S/2020/1283] 




Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
[S/2019/469] 
United Nations Security Council, June 2019 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/S_2019_469_E.pdf  
 
3. Policy and regulation 
Unintended consequences or ambivalent policy objectives? Conflict minerals and 
mining reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
Diemel, J. A., & Hilhorst, D. J. (2019). Development Policy Review, 37(4), 453-469. 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/dpr.12372  
This discourse analysis looks at reform policy objectives aiming to break the linkages between 
mineral extraction and violent conflict. The study looked at four policy documents issued between 
2010 and 2012: the UN Group of Experts report, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (article 1502),7 the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible 
Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, and the International 
Conference on the Great Lake Region (ICGLR) Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM) 
Manual.  
The authors find “much reform practice is geared towards conflict-free sourcing, and is far less 
appropriate when it comes to promoting peace” (p453) and that these two objectives may be out 
of alignment. Policies are often implemented in zones where there is little conflict and are narrow 
in scope. The policies tended to rely too heavily on the government and there was indifference to 
the impact of the reforms on poor miners. The authors question whether traceability is in place to 
clear the conscience of buyers rather than to improve the situation for the Congolese population.  
 
Exaggerating unintended effects? Competing narratives on the impact of conflict 
minerals regulation 
Koch, D. & Kinsbergen, S. (2018). Resources Policy, 57, 255-263. 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301420717302222  
 
7 An outline of Dodd-Frank 1502 can be found here https://enoughproject.org/special-topics/progress-and-
challenges-conflict-minerals-facts-dodd-frank-1502 (accessed 3/9/21) 
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This article analyses the Dodd-Frank act (article 1502) which “obliges stock listed companies in 
the United States to declare which due diligence they exercised to prevent Tin, Tungsten, 
Tantalite and Gold (3TG) in their supply chain from contributing to conflict in the Great Lakes 
region of Africa” (p256). Authors find that when negative unintended effects were declining 
companies who stood to gain from deregulation were omitting this positive change from their 
narrative. Researchers and policy makers are cautioned in reproducing or using claims without 
critical assessment.  
 
Successful implementation of conflict mineral certification and due diligence 
schemes and the European Union’s role: lessons learned for responsible mineral 
supply 
Eslave, N. (2018). Projekt Consult. STRADE. Funded by the Horizon 2020 Programme of the 
European Union Programme. 
http://stradeproject.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/STRADE_Report_D4.19_Due_Diligence_Certifi
cation.pdf  
This report finds limited implementation of mine certification, traceability, or due diligence in 
mining practices in the DRC. Considerations around implementation identified by the report are: 
• Whether the principal focus is on artisanal or small-scale mining 
• Certification approach pass/fail or progressive 
• Whether implementers are local government agencies or third-parties 
• Data collection and dispersion methods. 
“Due diligence and supply chain transparency mechanisms that issue certifications in the mid- to 
downstream fully depend on the successful implementation of standards in the upstream” (p2). 
Institutional quality and enforcement tends to be lacking in the upstream. Standards implemented 
by third-parties fare better in areas of limited government capacity. However, third parties are 
more expensive and so less favoured by small operators. Downstream operators face 
implementation costs, lack of clarity regarding exact requirements, lack of cooperation from 
suppliers, and reporting.    
Audit costs may be higher for artisanal mining regulation as the dynamism of the sector requires 
more regular audits. Standards that use minimum and incremental progress criteria together are 
suggested to be successful as operators can gradually improve their practice and large-scale 
operators are pushed towards full alignment with international best practice.  
Strategic Dialogue on Sustainable Raw Materials for Europe (STRADE) recommendations 
include: 
• Assessment of how standards have impacted the conditions they sought to change 
• Set an example by encouraging responsible mineral sourcing via its public procurement 
rules either via regulatory demands or through preferential bid evaluation 
• Adopt a methodology that allows Conflict-Affected High-Risk Areas (CAHRAs) to be 
identified at the sub-national level and to be adapted over short periods of time 
• Fund supply chain research and development 
• Undertake periodic assessment of standards 
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• Consider the local social and cultural dynamics that underpin the activity, leading to the 
design of inadequate incentives for certification. 
 
Resource cursed or policy cursed? US regulation of conflict minerals and 
violence in the Congo  
Parker, D. P., & Vadheim, B. (2017). Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource 
Economists, 4(1), 1-49. 
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/689865  
This report uses georeferenced before and after data to look at the impacts of the Dodd-Frank 
Act of 2010 section on conflict minerals. The research finds looting increased by 143% (from 
2004 to 2012) and that battles were more likely in territories with unregulated gold since the 
legislation. The authors look at pathways from resource value shocks to conflict. Labour 
intensive, artisanal mining will produce opportunity cost effects lowering the net value of mineral 
endowment and increasing conflict.  
An analytical framework looks at militia group choices and how different site values are affected 
by the legislation.  
 
Challenges for Global Supply Chain Sustainability: Evidence from Conflict 
Minerals Reports 
Kim, Y. H., & Davis, G. F. (2016). Academy of Management Journal, 59(6), 1896-1916. 
https://journals.aom.org/doi/abs/10.5465/amj.2015.0770  
Investigation of corporation response to Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act found that almost 
80% (of 1,300 corporations in the study) were unable to determine the country of origin of 
materials and only 1% could certify themselves as conflict-free with certainty beyond reasonable 
doubt. Internationally diversified firms and those with more dispersed supply chains were less 
likely to declare their products conflict-free. Widespread outsourcing reduces capacity to account 
for the practices that yield products.     
 
An Unintended Legacy: The External Policy Responses of the USA and European 
Union to Conflict Minerals in Africa 
Addaney, M., & Lubaale, E. C. (2021). An Unintended Legacy: The External Policy Responses of the 
USA and European Union to Conflict Minerals in Africa. Laws, 10(2), 50. 
https://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/10/2/50  
In 2017 the European Union (EU) adopted regulations8 to stop the importation of conflict 
minerals in Europe and they come into force in 2021. This article analyses the regulations in light 
of Section 1052 of the US Dodd-Frank Act. Challenges identified with the implementation of the 
 
8 The regulations are available here https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017R0821&from=EN (accessed on 12 May 2021) 
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Dodd-Frank Act include the abandonment of minerals by several companies who were not 
prepared to take on the extra costs and due diligence which negatively affected incomes and 
livelihoods for civilians. Armed groups resorted to looting to make up for lost funding. 
The authors suggest that the EU regulation is a weak normative framework for redressing conflict 
mineral issues. The targeting of importers mean that companies dealing with finished products 
will not be accountable. There is also a risk that importation shifts to companies based outside of 
the EU. Another weakness in the regulation is that small quantities are exempt. And there is 
concern over the scope of natural resources covered.  
 
Unintended Consequences of Sanctions for Human Rights: Conflict Minerals and 
Infant Mortality 
Parker, D. P., Foltz, J. D., & Elsea, D. (2016). The Journal of Law and Economics, 59(4), 731-774. 
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/691793  
This report estimates the effect of the Dodd-Frank Act, and its resultant reduction in mineral 
purchases, on infant mortality in Eastern DRC. The authors find the probability of infant deaths 
for children born before 2013 to have increased by 143%. This is proposed to be connected to 
the reduction in mothers’ consumption of infant health care goods and services.  
 
Conflict Minerals in the Corporate Supply Chain: Is Transparency the Solution to 
Human Rights Violations in the Tantalum, Tin, Tungsten and Gold Supply Chains? 
Härkönen, E. (2018). European Business Law Review, 29(5). 
https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/European+Business+Law+Review/29.5/EULR2018027  
This article suggests ways in which the costs of transparency requirements for companies can be 
reduced. The author identifies slow speed of participation of actors in the supply chain as a 
hindrance to transparency. The report recognised legislation as only one component of a multi-
level approach that is required to solve armed conflicts in resource rich countries. 
 
4. Further links 
A Swiss‐Army Knife? A Critical Assessment of the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) in Ghana  
Andrews, N. (2016). Business and Society Review, 121(1), 59-83. 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/basr.12081  
The Impact of Dodd-Frank and Conflict Minerals Reforms on Eastern Congo’s Conflict 




   
 
13 
Not only a man's world: women's involvement in artisanal mining in eastern DRC 
Bashwira, M. R., Cuvelier, J., Hilhorst, D., & Van der Haar, G. (2014). Resources Policy, 40, 109-
116. 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S030142071300113X  
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from Eastern Congo  
de la Sierra. R. S. (2014). Private Enterprise Development in Low-Income Countries (PEDL) 
Research Note.  
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chains 
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Policy, 20(1), 83-111. 
https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/peps-2013-0053/html  
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http://www.saccps.org/pdf/3-1/SAPSS%203(1)%20Castillo%20Iglesias.pdf 
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https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0361368217301149  
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Jameson, N. J., Song, X., & Pecht, M. (2016). Science and engineering ethics, 22(5), 1375-1389. 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11948-015-9704-7 
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https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0301420713001219  
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